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Negotiating International Copyright
Protection: The United States and
European Community Positions
ANNE MOEBES*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the globalization of world media markets and the increase
in piracy of copyrighted works, countries that export a substantial
amount of copyrighted works, such as the United States and the Eu-
ropean Community' ("EC"), have acquired a heightened interest in
international copyright protection. In the United States, foreign sales
account for over fifty percent of the distribution earnings of major
films. 2 Until now, the EC has not had significant export earnings
from the sales of films and television programs, due to linguistic dif-
ferences and the small and fragmented nature of the EC. However,
the EC members have deregulated and privatized these industries.
The result has been an increased demand for audiovisual program-
ming in the EC, much of which will be exported.3 Further, many
other industries concerned with copyright protection, such as the
computer and publishing industries, will experience an increase in de-
mand upon the formation of the European single market program,
referred to as "1992."4
* Attorney-Advisor, Office of Chief Counsel, National Telecommunications and Infor-
mation Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. B.A., Appalachian State University,
1979; J.D., North Carolina Central University, 1985; Federal Communications Commission,
1987-91; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, expected 1992. The author is involved
in telecommunications policy matters in her work, and is studying various collateral subjects in
her LL.M. program, such as domestic and international copyright protection, First Amend-
ment law, European Community law, and international business.
The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the National Tele-
communications and Information Administration.
1. The EC is currently comprised of 12 member states: France, the United Kingdom,
Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, Portugal,
and Greece. Common Market in Profile, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 101, at 111 (1987).
2. ROBERT B. COHEN, THE U.S. POLICY RESPONSE TO EUROPE'S CHANGING TELEVI-
SION AND FILM MARKET 5 (Economic Policy Inst., U.S. Dep't of Commerce Reply Cmt. No.
900241-0041, 1990).
3. It is estimated that European earnings from film, television broadcasting, and home
video rentals combined could grow from $28 billion to $58 billion over the next ten years. Id.
4. The EC was established in 1957. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN Eco-
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To combat piracy, and thereby reduce the trade deficit as it re-
lates to such piracy, the United States and EC governments have en-
gaged in a series of negotiations aimed at strengthening copyright
laws and their enforcement. However, there are certain areas of copy-
right law in which the two governments disagree. This is complicat-
ing efforts to present a united front in international copyright
negotiations.
This Article describes the present status of international copy-
right protection, as well as the status of various multilateral, bilateral,
and unilateral activities in which the United States is engaged. This
Article then addresses which forum or combination of fora presents
the best alternative for protecting United States copyrights interna-
tionally. Because the EC figures prominently in the ongoing negotia-
tions, the Article emphasizes the United States' relations with the EC,
in the context of various negotiations currently underway.
The specific international copyright agreements and negotiations
that are explored in this Article include the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works5 ("Berne Convention"); the
talks involving Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
("TRIPs"), which are being conducted by one of the multilateral
working groups in the pending Uruguay Round of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade6 ("GATT") negotiations; the ongoing har-
monization talks undertaken by the World Intellectual Property
Organization 7 ("WIPO"), including the Dispute Settlement Treaty
and the Model Copyright/Berne Protocol; and the bilateral and uni-
lateral efforts by the United States and the EC.
NOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]. Its goal was the removal of internal trade barriers
within 12 years by harmonizing laws and standards. In July 1987, the Single European Act
("SEA") became effective. 1 TRAITES, INSTITUANT LES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES 801
(1987). The SEA intends to create a single market. Its goal is to assure the free movement of
persons, goods, services, and capital throughout the EC by the end of 1992. This is to be
achieved by the mutual recognition of minimum standards, which are prescribed in directives
issued by the EC Commission, the law-making body that drafts all proposals for EC legisla-
tion. If a directive is adopted by the EC Council, all member states must implement the direc-
tive into their own legislation, even if they did not approve of a given directive.
5. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
6. See Ministerial Declarations on the Uruguay Round, GATT MIN. DEC. 7-8 (Sept. 20,
1986), cited in R. Michael Gadbaw & Rosemary E. Gwynn, Intellectual Property Rights in the
New GATT Round, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL
CONFLICT 38 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988).
7. "WIPO is a specialized agency within the United Nations system. Its central role is
to conduct studies and provide services designed to facilitate protection of intellectual prop-
erty.". MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 348 n.21 (1989).
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II. THE BERNE CONVENTION
Any discussion of international copyright protection begins with
the Berne Convention. In this regard, it is useful to outline some of
its basic provisions. The members of the Berne Convention constitute
a union designed to protect the rights of authors in their literary and
artistic works.8 The union's aim is to extend the copyright protec-
tions available in one member country to all other member countries.9
A copyrighted work is protected by the national legislation of the
country in which it was originally published; that is, by the country of
origin, and not by the Berne Convention's provisions themselves.' 0
Thus, while any country may join the Berne Convention, it must be
prepared to implement national legislation to conform to the mini-
mum standards set forth in the Berne Convention." Member coun-
tries may sign separate agreements among themselves if those
agreements meet the minimum standards of, and do not contradict,
the Berne Convention.' 2 The Berne Convention dictates three types
of standards: (1) substantive standards;' 3 (2) standards or definitions
referred to in competent national laws;' 4 and (3) administrative stan-
8. Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
9. See id. art. 2.
10. M.M. BOGUSLAVSKY, COPYRIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS 90 (David Catterns ed. & N.
Poulet trans., 1979). For work published for the first time in a country that is a member of the
Berne Convention, the country of origin is considered the country of first publication. Berne
Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(4)(a). If the work is published simultaneously in several mem-
ber countries granting different terms of protection, the country of origin is that country grant-
ing the shortest term of protection. Id. If it is published simultaneously in a country outside
the union and a country of the union, the latter is considered to be the country of origin. Id.
Country of origin is also defined for certain special cases. For example, a cinematographic
work's country of origin is considered to be the country of the union in which the maker
resides or has its headquarters. Id. art. 5(4)(c)(i).
11. Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 36.
12. BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 10, at 75. In addition to multilateral conventions, such as
the Berne Convention, countries may make specialized agreements, such as the Rome Conven-
tion for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organiza-
tions, which involves the protection of neighboring rights. Rome Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26,
1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome Convention]. The United States is not a member of
this convention, although several EC countries are, including Great Britain and Denmark.
BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 10, at 77-78.
13. BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 10, at 88-89.
14. Id. For example, the Berne Convention grants rights to "authors" and their "assign-
ees," but does not define these terms. Id. at 89. Rather, individual countries decide these
definitions. Id. To further illustrate, the United States may legislate a work-for-hire doctrine,
which protects the right of employers as authors, while other Berne countries, such as those in
the EC, may not consider an employer an author.
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dards of the Berne Convention itself.' 5
The persons entitled to rights under the Berne Convention in-
clude: (1) authors who are nationals of member countries and have
published their works for the first time in one of the member coun-
tries, or in any country according to the Paris text, or are nationals of
member countries and are authors of unpublished works; (2) persons
without citizenship who reside in member countries; (3) authors who
are nationals of non-member countries, but usually reside in a mem-
ber country; and (4) authors who are nationals of non-member coun-
tries, but whose works were originally published in a member country
or were published simultaneously in a member country and a non-
member country. 1 6 The Berne Convention also provides for reciproc-
ity between individual members so that member countries may re-
strict the rights of authors from non-member countries who do not
reside in a member country.1 7
The Berne Convention includes an illustrative list of protected
works, which generally fit into two groups. The first group includes
books, pamphlets, dramatic and dramatico-musical works, choreo-
graphic and musical compositions, with or without words, cinemato-
graphic works, painting, sculpture, and architectural works.1 8 The
majority of these works enjoy full unconditional protection defined in
the Berne Convention itself. The second group is protected by the
domestic legislation of member countries, and includes official texts of
a legislative, administrative, or legal nature, as well as the official
translations of such texts and political speeches.' 9
The Berne Convention also provides that the enjoyment and ex-
ercise of copyright in the member countries shall not depend on any
special conditions or formalities. 20  Thus, when the United States
joined the Berne Convention in 1988, its implementating legislation
eliminated all formalities previously required to obtain a copyright.
21
Further, under the Berne Convention, the minimum term of pro-
tection is the duration of the author's life plus fifty years. 22 Where a
15. Id.
16. Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
17. Id. art. 6.
18. Id. art. 2(1); see also BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 10, at 93.
19. Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 2b'; see also BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 10, at 93.
20. Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(2).
21. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
22. Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 7. For further discussion of terms of protection
under the Berne Convention, see BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 10, at 98-100.
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member country's national legislation sets a longer period, the law of
the country where protection is sought controls.23
III. BEYOND THE BERNE CONVENTION
Currently, the Berne Convention provides the broadest multilat-
eral basis for international copyright protection. However, in its pres-
ent form, the Berne Convention leaves many questions unresolved.
Some of these questions relate to the structure of the Berne Conven-
tion itself. Other gaps exist in its settlement dispute mechanisms.
The application of the Berne Convention's existing substantive stan-
dards, coupled with the omission of vitally important standards, pro-
vides still more complications.
While different fora may be appropriate for resolving different
issues, international copyright protection is best achieved through si-
multaneous employment of several mechanisms. For this reason, the
United States is pursuing several different activities designed to go
beyond the Berne Convention. In determining which combination of
methods will achieve the United States' goals most effectively, it is
important to understand how each method operates, as well as to un-
derstand the issues involved.
A. WIPO
One option is to have WIPO prepare treaties and protocols,
based on input from the international community, in areas unad-
dressed by the Berne Convention. This proposal would give WIPO
the broadest authority to decide conflicting interpretations of the
Berne Convention and to establish new policies in international copy-
right protection.
1. The WIPO Model Copyright Law as a Berne Protocol
To resolve substantive gaps in the Berne Convention, WIPO's
interpretive protocol would cover new substantive areas of concern,
such as computers, including software protection and rental rights, as
well as provide an exception for reverse engineering.24 Currently,
23. BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 10, at 99.
24. Reverse engineering is the cloning of computer products. See Events of Note, 7 CoM-
PUTER LAW., Nov. 1990, at 38. The Berne Convention currently does not deal with computer
programs. See generally Berne Convention, supra note 5; Intellectual Property, House Panel
Holds Second Oversight Hearing on Software Protection, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Mar.
9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File.
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WIPO is evaluating these and other issues in its attempt to draft a
model copyright law.25 The model law would accomplish several
goals. First, the information gathered would be useful in preparing a
Berne Protocol. In addition, the WIPO model law would provide an
example for countries to emulate in creating their own copyright leg-
islation.26 Furthermore, it would help countries to modernize and up-
grade their copyright laws to conform to generally accepted
international norms. 27
2. Dispute Settlement Treaty
WIPO also plans to prepare a Dispute Settlement Treaty to rem-
edy what many believe are the impractical dispute settlement mecha-
nisms in the Berne Convention. 28  For example, the Berne
Convention's mechanism for referring disputes to the International
Court of Justice29 is long, cumbersome, and complex. One WIPO dis-
pute settlement proposal calls for a two-tiered system whereby WIPO
would review alleged violations of a TRIPs agreement and decide
whether a violation exists. 30 The violation would then trigger the in-
volvement of GATT members in resolving the dispute.31 The GATT
members' sole function would be to consider the economic harm
caused by the violation. 32
B. The TRIPs Talks-GA TT Uruguay Round
A TRIPs agreement would provide another alternative for inter-
national copyright protection. The TRIPs talks include a proposed
intellectual property code within the GATT.33 In the Uruguay
25. State Department Panel Examines Proposal by WIPO for International Copyright
Laws, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 77 (Jan. 18, 1989).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. WIPO Committee to Move Ahead with Dispute Settlement Treaty, 37 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1370 (Sept. 18, 1991).
29. Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 33.
30. See Chakravarthi Raghaven, Trade: Chile for Complementary WIPO and GATT
Roles in TRIPs, INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 5, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IN-
PRES File.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Yvan Chemla, EC Farming Policy Suicidal: Thai Premier, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
July 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, INTNAT Library; Limited Intellectual Property Code Ex-
pected From Talks, PMA Official Says, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Aug. 16, 1990, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File; Jack Robertson, USTR: Japan CPU Buys Too
Low; U.S. Trade Representative Includes a Related Article on the Push for a 20 Percent Share of
306 [Vol. 14:301
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Round, the United States will seek to develop a GATT model of
rulemaking and dispute settlement to be applied in the intellectual
property area.3 4 These efforts would identify internationally recog-
nized minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property
rights, enforcement procedures, consultation and dispute settlement
mechanisms for resolving intragovernmental disputes regarding inter-
pretation and enforcement of model norms, and protection of intellec-
tual property rights as a fundamental part of GATT concessions.3 5 A
failure to honor international standards would constitute grounds for
withdrawal of GATT concessions.3 6 The United States and EC differ,
however, with respect to some of the substantive standards that
should be included in a GATT intellectual property code.
1. TRIPs Incorporation of Substantive Standards
The GATT is a contract among its members, and thus can be
extended to cover any subject, including the protection of intellectual
property rights, provided a consensus decides that the failure to pro-
tect these rights inhibits international trade.3 7 For example, the
GATT rules currently authorize members to enforce intellectual
property rights at their borders. 38
In the TRIPs negotiations, the EC will seek to incorporate by
reference the obligations of the Berne Convention and add obligations
to protect computer programs as literary works; provide rental rights
for cinematographic works, computer programs, and sound record-
ings; and provide so-called "neighboring rights, ' 39 which are the
rights of performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasting organi-
zations guaranteed by the Rome Convention for the Protection of
the Japanese Semiconductor Market for US Companies, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Apr. 1, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ELCNWS File.
34. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 6, at 39-40.
35. Id. at 40; see also Ernest H. Preeg, The GATT Trading System in Transition: An
Analytic Survey of Percent Literature, 12 WASH. Q., Autumn 1989, at 199.
36. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 6, at 40.
37. Id. at 43.
38. Article XX(d) of the GATT provides in pertinent part: "[N]othing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement ... of measures... necessary
to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Agreement, including ... the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the
prevention of deceptive practices." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
art. XX(d), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
39. Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, pt. 1, art.
1, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGII/W/68 (March 27, 1990) (special distribution by the delga-
tion of the European Communities) [hereinafter EC TRIPs Proposal].
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Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Or-
ganizatons4° ("Rome Convention"). The United States TRIPs propo-
sal, in contrast, would require contracting parties to provide authors
and their successors in title the economic rights provided in the Berne
Convention.4' However, the United States proposal would not in-
clude the "moral rights" 42 provisions of the Berne Convention.
43
Assessing the positions of the EC and the United States on ad-
ding substantive standards to the Berne Convention, or otherwise,
within TRIPs, requires an examination of the EC's recent policy pa-
pers and the United States' response. In June 1988, the EC Commis-
sion began looking at various copyright issues in its Green Paper on
Copyright and the Challenge of New Technologies" ("Green Paper")
to determine what areas of copyright law might require minimum EC
standards to complete "1992." The Green Paper encompasses, among
other things, home copying, rental rights, and protection of computer
programs and databases.45 On May 5, 1990, the EC Commission is-
sued a communication intended as a follow-up to the Green Paper,
entitled Working Programme of the Commission in the Field of Copy-
right and Neighbouring Rights46 ("Follow-up Paper"). The Follow-up
Paper outlines the steps the Commission will take with respect to
copyright and neighboring rights covering the period up to December
31, 1992.47
In the Green Paper, the EC Commission set forth alternatives for
resolving home copying problems, which allegedly result in economic
40. Rome Convention, supra note 12. Because the United States is not a member of this
convention, it is not obligated to recognize neighboring rights.
41. Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Annex J, pt. 1,
United States Trade Representative (May 1, 1990) (unpublished draft, on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Journal) [hereinafter US. TRIPs Proposal].
42. The Berne Convention provides as follows:
[I]ndependently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.
Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 6 b .
43. See U.S. TRIPs Proposal, supra note 41, pt. 2A, art. 1.
44. Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology-Copyright Issues Re-
quiring Immediate Action, COM(88)172 final [hereinafter Green Paper].
45. See id.
46. Follow-up to the Green Paper: Working Programme of the Commission in the Field
of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, COM(90)584 final [hereinafter Follow-up Paper].
47. Id. at 1.
International Copyright Protection
harm to rights-owners. 48 One option, proposed by some member and
non-member states, was to put a levy on blank tapes.49 Another op-
tion followed a "pay at the source" approach, under which rights-
owners would be remunerated for private copying out of the sales pro-
ceeds of the original recording.50 Other suggested measures involved
mandatory technical solutions, such as equipping recording machines
with technical features to inhibit or prevent copying.5 I To prevent
digital copying from digital audio tape ("DAT") recorders, the EC
Commission, in the Follow-up Paper, favored the general use of the
Serial Copy Management System ("SCMS") method for DAT
equipment.
52
Although the United States also favors the SCMS approach, it
did not include this approach in its TRIPs proposal. However, the
United States proposal contains a special provision for sound record-
ings, requiring contracting parties to provide sound recording produ-
cers all of the rights specified for the authors of copyrighted works,
excluding the public performance right.53 In contrast, the EC TRIPs
proposal gives sound recording producers the right of public perform-
ance as part of their protections under the Rome Convention. 54 How-
ever, the United States is not a member of the Rome Convention, and
thus is not obligated to recognize neighboring rights.
The fact that the United States and the EC are among the largest
computer software exporters in the world underscores their interests
in computer software protection.5 5 The EC Commission proposed a
directive on computer program protection, which the EC Council
adopted in October 1990.56 The EC Council, in turn, issued a direc-
tive on May 14, 199157 ("Computer Directive"), calling for the pro-
tection of computer programs as literary works under copyright
48. Green Paper, supra note 44, at 100, 132.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 125, 135.
51. Id. at 119, 129.
52. Follow-up Paper, supra note 46, at 13. The SCMS method allows unlimited first-
generation digital copying, but prohibits second-generation copying, so that rights-owners keep
at least partial control over the exploitation of their works. Id.
53. US. TRIPs Proposal, supra note 41, pt. 2A, art. 9.
54. EC TRIPs Proposal, supra note 39, pt. 2A, art. 7.
55. Michelle Osborne & John Hillkirk, Looking Ahead: USA Has Bright Future, But Is
"Wounded Giant," USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 1990, at 15A.
56. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Pro-
grams, COM(90)509 final [hereinafter Amended Proposal].
57. Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 [hereinafter Computer Directive].
1992]
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law,58 with a protection term of fifty years from creation. 59 Under the
Computer Directive, the copyright for programs created under con-
tract is held by the commissioning party, unless the contract provides
otherwise.-6 The copyright owner has exclusive rights of reproduc-
tion, adaptation, and distribution.6' It also has exclusive rental
rights.62  Those acquiring copies of programs legally can observe,
study, or test them without further express authorization from the
rights-owner.
63
The United States supports the Computer Directive because the
directive favors largely non-European software firms over the inter-
ests of users and European competitors. 64 However, the Computer
Directive differs from section 117 of the United States Copyright
Act 65 in that section 117 authorizes a user to make a single backup
copy of a computer program. 6
6
Issues relating to interoperability 67 and reverse engineering have
emerged as well. Software manufacturers from the United States and
the EC lobbied the EC Commission to include provisions providing
that interfaces68 are not subject to copyright protection, and permit-
ting reverse engineering or decompilation 69 of existing computer pro-
grams. 70  Interoperability is desirable because vendors can offer
products that comply with industry standard interfaces. 71 If software
can be monopolized by copyright, users will be forced to purchase it
from primary vendors. While this would benefit most United States
58. Id. art. 1; see also EC TRIPs Proposal, supra note 39, art. 2.
59. Computer Directive, supra note 57, art. 8.
60. Id. art. 2(3).
61. Id. art. 4.
62. Id.
63. Id. art. 5.
64. See European Parliament Gives Final Approval to EC Directive on Software Protection,
17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 623 (Apr. 24, 1991) [hereinafter European Parliament].
65. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1989).
66. Id.
67. Interoperable computer programs are those that can operate with or replace existing
programs in computer systems. Amended Proposal, supra note 56, at C320/23.
68. Interfaces are the means of interconnection and interaction required to permit all
elements of software and hardware to work with other software and hardware, and with users,
in all of the ways they are intended to function. Id.
69. Decompilation is a process whereby a program's machine-readable object code is cop-
ied and converted to a source code, which can then be read by users. Id.
70. See Dean Takahashi, Q & A: Stephen H. Lacount; A Harder Line on Software, Own-
ers, Courts Getting with the Copyright Program, L.A. TIMES (Orange County ed.), Jan. 7, 1991,
at D6.
71. See European Parliament, supra note 64, at 623.
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vendors who are dominant in their product lines, 72 it would adversely
affect the European software industry.
The EC is in favor of allowing reverse engineering or decompila-
tion of existing programs, because copyright law has always permitted
limited copying for purposes of research and study.73 Additionally,
this would enable European firms to develop new products.74 The
Computer Directive permits decompilation without a rights-owner's
permission where reproduction of the code and translation of its form
are indispensable to the interoperability of an independently created
program.
75
The United States opposes both of these proposals because of the
economic incentive for software developers to ensure interoperability
for users.76 In addition, it contends that allowing copying of inter-
faces would serve no purpose. 77 Moreover, as the United States is
concerned primarily with piracy by developing countries, it has as-
serted that no country's copyright law expressly permits reverse
engineering.
78
With respect to databases, the EC Commission proposed in the
Follow-up Paper that a directive be drafted to harmonize copyright
protection for databases. 79 The EC Commission concluded that
databases are protected by copyright law.80 The generally accepted
term of protection originates in article 7 of the Berne Convention,
which provides protection for fifty years from creation with the possi-
bility of increasing the term to seventy years. 8'
The United States supports protection of databases regardless of
whether the underlying data is copyrighted or uncopyrighted mate-
rial.8 2 In addition, the United States supports the right to import and
to authorize or prohibit the rental of computer programs after the sale
72. See Takahashi, supra note 70, at D6.
73. See generally Mark Powell, Software Licenses and the Application of the EC Competi-
tion Rules, 8 COMPUTER LAW., July 1991, at 13.
74. See id.
75. Computer Directive, supra note 57, art. 6.
76. Powell, supra note 73.
77. Id.
78. US. TRIPs Proposal, supra note 41, pt. 2A, art. 2.
79. Follow-up Paper, supra note 46, at 13.
80. Id. at 18; see also Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 7. A proposed definition of
"database" would include the following elements: (1) collection, organization, and storage of
data; and (2) information in a digital form that can be processed by means of a computer.
Follow-up Paper, supra note 46, at 18.
81. Follow-up Paper, supra note 46, at 19.
82. US. TRIPs Proposal, supra note 41, pt. 2A, art. 2(b).
1992]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
of an original or copy. 83 Furthermore, the United States favors a
fifty-year term of protection from authorized publication, or if no
publication occurs within fifty years of the work's creation, fifty years
from creation.
8 4
2. Enforcement Measures
Another important issue in the TRIPs negotiations involves stan-
dards for enforcement of intellectual property rights, both internally
and at the border. The United States and EC TRIPs proposals would
impose substantial obligations on countries to establish procedures,
provide "due process," ensure adequate penalties to compensate intel-
lectual property owners for infringement of their rights, and deter in-
fringement suits.8 5 However, the issue of "transparency,"8 6 which is
the requirement that countries provide some means for rights-owners
to obtain the information needed to present their case, might be
viewed as an attempt by the United States to force signatories to
adopt its discovery procedures. At the same time, the United States
contends that the majority of EC members, which are mostly civil law
countries, make litigation more difficult because sufficient information
is not made available before trial.
87
Border enforcement is another contentious issue. In 1989, a
GATT panel found that section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended,88 is inconsistent with the national treatment provisions of
the GATT.8 9 The EC disfavors section 337 and may make it an issue
83. Id. pt. 2A, art. 2(2)(a)-(b).
84. Id. pt. 2A, art. 5.
85. See id. pt. 3, sec. 1, art. 1; EC TRIPs Proposal, supra note 39, pt. 3, sec. 1, art. 1.
86. See EC TRIPs Proposal, supra note 39, pt. 5, art. 2. Cf U.S. TRIPs Proposal, supra
note 41, pt. 1, art. 3.
87. Hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcomm. of the House Energy and Com-
merce Comm., FED. NEWS SERV., Sept. 24, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
FEDNEW File, continued in FED. NEWS SERV., Sept. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, FEDNEW File [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing].
88. Pub. L. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)). Under section
337, a plaintiff, foreign or domestic, may bring an action for infringement of an intellectual
property right. Previously, a plaintiff had to show that the defendant engaged in an unfair act
or method of competition, and that importation of the articles affected a domestic industry.
Under section 337, there are two different procedures for foreign and United States plaintiffs.
See id.
89. The GATT panel found significant procedural differences between a federal district
court patent infringement action available to foreign plaintiffs and an International Trade
Commission investigation and proceeding based on allegations of patent infringement involv-
ing an imported product available to United States plaintiffs. United States Section 337 of the
Tariff Act, GATT Doc. L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989) (report by the panel).
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during the TRIPs negotiations. However, the United States Congress
has indicated that it will not repeal section 337.
3. Dispute Settlement
If the TRIPs agreement becomes an amendment to the GATT,
the existing provisions for dispute settlement will apply in GATT
member disputes. However, if TRIPs becomes a separate annex of
the GATT, the United States and the EC will want dispute settlement
provisions that at least follow those in the GATT, particularly the
ability of a party to the TRIPs agreement to withdraw trade conces-
sions negotiated under the GATT if another party fails to correct a
violation.90 Under the GATT, if one party believes another party has
failed to comply with a GATT obligation, the first party serves notice
on the party allegedly in breach, who must then give the matter sym-
pathetic consideration. 9' If a satisfactory settlement is not reached
within a reasonable time, a GATT panel may consider the matter.
92
The panel may make recommendations, give a ruling, or, if serious
enough, authorize a party to suspend its obligations under the
GATT. 93 If its obligations are suspended, the party may advise the
Secretary-General within sixty days of its intention to withdraw from
the proceeding. 94 Such withdrawal would take effect upon the expira-
tion of sixty days from the date of written notice. This process is
referred to as "blocking a proceeding." 95
C. Bilateral and Unilateral Activities
In 1984, the United States Congress enacted section 301 as an
amendment to the Trade Act of 1974.96 The amendment authorized
the president of the United States to impose trade sanctions against
any country that inadequately protects United States' intellectual
property rights and engages in "unreasonable or unjustifiable" trade
practices. 97 This authority was strengthened by the Omnibus Trade
90. US. TRIPs Proposal, supra note 41, pt. 3, sec. 1, art. 1; see also EC TRIPs Proposal,
supra note 39, pt. 5, art. 8.
91. GATT, supra note 38, art. XXIII(1).
92. Id. art. XXIII(2).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 301-304, 98 Stat. 2948,
3000 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2487 (1988)).
97. Id.
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and Competitiveness Act of 1988,98 which created the "Special 301"
provision. 99 Under "Special 301," the United States Trade Represen-
tative ("USTR") must identify "priority foreign countries" that do
not provide adequate and effective intellectual property protection to
United States rights-owners.100 The list of such countries is published
in the Federal Register, and a six-month investigation follows.10 If
the USTR finds that a particular country on the list is engaged in
"unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory" trade practices, the
USTR must recommend trade sanctions to the president. 10 2 After
that, the president must take retaliatory action.103
The USTR has created two subsidiary lists to avoid designating
the United States' trading partners as "priority foreign countries" in
all cases demanding negotiations. First, the "Priority Watch List" is
comprised of countries in which United States rights-owners suffer
from lack of protection. 10 4 A six-month timetable for bilateral negoti-
ations with these countries was established. 10 5 Second, the "Watch
List" is comprised of countries that also present problems for United
States rights-owners, but of a less immediate nature than the Priority
Watch countries. 10 6 A one-year timetable for bilateral negotiations
with Watch List countries was established. 10 7
The 1990 Watch List included the three member states of
Greece, Italy, and Spain.10 8 The USTR, Carla Hills, decided that suc-
cessful completion of the TRIPs negotiations in the GATT was a pri-
ority, and therefore did not designate any priority countries in
1990.109
IV. NEGOTIATING THE BEST UNITED STATES RESULT
In order to negotiate the most beneficial international copyright
"98. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
99. Id. § 1303 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988)).
100. 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Statement on United States Action Against Foreign Trade Barriers, 25 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 777 (May 26, 1989).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HILLS ANNOUNCES RE-
SULTS OF SPECIAL 301 REVIEW 1 (Apr. 17, 1990) (Press Release).
109. Id.
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protection policy, the United States must prioritize its own objectives
and determine which mechanism will best accomplish those objec-
tives. At the same time, because the EC is likely to be its greatest ally,
the United States cannot formulate its own proposals without consid-
ering the objectives of the EC as well. Fortunately, the United States
and the EC seek generally similar objectives. However, there are cer-
tain areas of copyright law in which the United States differs from the
EC and must maintain a firm position.
When the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1988, it
did not agree with all of the Berne Convention's provisions, which
appeared to reflect the civil law approach practiced in the majority of
the EC countries.110 However, the United States gained certain ad-
vantages by joining the Berne Convention. First, other countries
would not criticize the United States during trade and intellectual
property negotiations for not being committed to the international
protection of copyright."' Nor would other countries retaliate
against the United States under article 6(1) of the Berne Convention
by restricting protection of United States works when United States
authors use the back-door method of protection by simultaneous pub-
lication, which can be expensive to prove in foreign courts."l 2 Second,
foreign piracy of United States works has mushroomed. Conse-
quently, the Universal Copyright Convention," l 3 of which the United
States is a member, is inadequate because it provides only for national
treatment, and does not grant specific minimum rights.'1 4 Third, be-
cause revision of the Berne Convention requires a unanimous vote,
the United States could veto decisions that would injure its inter-
ests."- 5 Fourth, United States law is now more compatible with the
Berne Convention because it provides some degree of "moral rights"
protection. 1 6 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United
States' negotiating position in the TRIPs talks is strengthened by its
110. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., BERNE CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1988,
S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3714.
111. National Committee for the Berne Convention, Why the United States Should Join
the Berne Convention 3 (July 2, 1987) (unpublished, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Journal) [hereinafter National Committee Statement].
112. Id.
113. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132,
revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178.
114. National Committee Statement, supra note I 1l, at 3.
115. See Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 6 b"(l)-( 3 ); see also National Committee
Statement, supra note I 1l, at 4.
116. National Committee Statement, supra note 11l, at 6.
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membership in the Berne Convention.117 The United States would
rather have copyright protection enhanced through the GATT rather
than WIPO, because the United States believes the GATT would pro-
vide stronger protection.I " However, by joining the Berne Conven-
tion, the United States placed itself in a stronger position to advocate
the abandonment of the Berne Convention in favor of GATT
protection. 119
There are several other reasons why reliance on the Berne Con-
vention alone would not afford the United States the benefits of other
multilateral fora. Not only does the Berne Convention offer a consid-
erably lower level of protection than other current mechanisms, but
far fewer countries are members of the Berne Convention than the
GATT.1
20
One of the most important provisions of the Berne Convention is
the national treatment provision of article 5. Under article 5, persons
entitled to Berne Convention protection have in all the member coun-
tries "the rights which their respective laws do grant or may hereafter
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this
Convention."' 12' Thus, if the Berne Convention does not specify
otherwise, the laws of the country where protection is sought apply.
The drawback of the national treatment clause is that one member
country may not give as high a degree of protection to its nationals as
other member countries give to their nationals. Hence, this member
country will give a lower degree of protection to the nationals of other
member countries. However, because the Berne Convention sets min-
imum standards, it alleviates this problem to some extent.
An especially contentious issue between the EC and the United
States is the issue of moral rights. When the United States joined the
Berne Convention, Congress did not amend the Copyright Act 122 to
include moral rights. Rather, it averred that the "totality" of existing
United States law, including section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 23 state
117. Id. at 5.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Approximately 76 countries are members of the Berne Convention, whereas more
than 90 countries are members of the GATT. See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protectiong United
States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 293
(1991); SIDNEY GOLT, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS 1986-90: ORIGINS, ISSUES, AND PROS-
PECTS 2 (1988).
121. Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(1).
122. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
123. Lanham Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (1988).
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law rights of privacy and publicity, and the torts of defamation and
contract, were sufficient to comply with the Berne Convention.
1 24
The question of whether moral rights can be waived is not resolved by
the Berne Convention. If common law countries were to provide
moral rights protection, they would insist that such rights be waivable
for consideration in a contract. The civil law countries, which include
all of the EC member states except for the United Kingdom and Ire-
land, maintain that moral rights cannot be alienated or waived. 25
Article 11 of the Berne Convention, which protects the right of
public performance, is also noteworthy. It states that authors of dra-
matic, dramatico-musical, and musical works shall enjoy the exclusive
right of authorizing the following: (1) the public performance of their
works by any means; and (2) any communication to the public of the
performance of their works. 26 However, the term "public perform-
ance" is not defined in the Berne Convention. Under article 1 lbis,
authors enjoy exclusive rights to authorize the broadcasting or com-
munication of their works to the public. 27 However, under article
1 lbis(2), each country has the right to determine the circumstances
under which that exclusive right should be exercised, as long as the
authors' economic or moral rights are not prejudiced. 28 Because
United States copyright law required a compulsory license in this in-
stance, the United States Congress, in its legislation implementing the
Berne Convention, was forced to adopt a modified compulsory license
provision, pursuant to which parties must first try to negotiate a roy-
alty before obtaining a compulsory license, in order to comply with
the Berne Convention. I
29
The United States government must insist that the GATT, rather
than the Berne Convention, be the focus of United States' efforts to
improve intellectual property protection. Because the GATT con-
tains rules governing international trade, intellectual property stan-
dards are embodied in different international agreements administered
by WIPO. However, there is a growing awareness that international
trade and intellectual property protection are linked inextricably. The
basic GATT framework was premised on the idea that "the only legit-
124. S. Rep. No. 352, supra note 110, at 9-10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3714-15.
125. DR. ADOLF DIETZ, COPYRIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 182-84 (1978).
126. Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
127. Id. art. II b".
128. Id. art. ll'b(2).
129. See Berne Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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imate tool to regulate international trade was the tariff, and that tar-
iffs would be subject to negotiation."'' 30 If one country's trade was
injured by another country's trade measure that violated the GATT,
the injured country could claim that the benefits to which it was enti-
tled had been nullified or impaired.' 3 The same would be true if the
offending country's action was not proscribed specifically by the
GATT, but nonetheless nullified or impaired the benefits of another
country. 132 Thus, the GATT concept of nullification or impairment
provides the link between intellectual property rights and interna-
tional trade.
The ability of the United States to succeed in world markets
stems from its ability to develop new technology and to promote inno-
vation. 33 On the other hand, developing countries would like to ob-
tain technology without paying for its development. Because more
developing countries are members of the GATT than the various
WIPO-administered agreements, the United States and the EC would
be in a better position to protect technology and copyrighted works in
developing countries by using the GATT as a protection tool. 3 4 In
this regard, an important function of the GATT is its role as a forum
to address interpretation, resolve disputes, and focus economic pres-
sure on countries to respect GATT principles in their national
laws. 35 GATT protection would also encourage countries that al-
ready provide strong protection to join together to enforce broader
measures against infringing products. 36 Further, countries that do
not protect intellectual property rights would be motivated to sign a
GATT intellectual property code so that they could obtain economic
concessions beyond the intellectual property area.13 7
It appears from a review of the TRIPs proposals of the EC and
the United States that the United States' strategy in negotiating copy-
right protection in the TRIPs talks may be to adopt the EC's format
and as much of its language as possible, keeping the United States'
positions only when they differ significantly from the EC's positions.
This may be because the EC's alliance with the United States is vital
130. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 6, at 44.
131. Id.
132. Id.; see also GATT, supra note 38, art. XXIII.
133. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 6, at 41.
134. Cf. Berne Convention, supra note 5, signature pages; GATT, supra note 38.
135. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 6, at 42.
136. Id. at 46.
137. Id.
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in the TRIPs negotiations. 38 As noted above, the main controversy
between the EC and the United States concerns the incorporation of
Berne obligations into the GATT. The United States maintains that
the GATT is intended to deal only with economic obligations affect-
ing international trade, and that, therefore, the "moral rights" provi-
sions of the Berne Convention should not be subject to GATT dispute
settlement. 39 Copyright intensive industries, such as film producing
and broadcasting, would be most vulnerable to GATT challenges by
GATT members that recognized stronger moral rights protection.
This is because these industries invariably edit or adapt copyrighted
works in such a way that a GATT panel might find violative of an
author's moral rights.
One way to resolve the Berne incorporation controversy is to
provide that the TRIPs agreement will only create obligations and
rights between contracting parties and not between individuals, as
proposed in both the United States and the EC TRIPs proposals.
With the inclusion of such language, even if moral rights are incorpo-
rated into the GATT, challenge by other nations will be unlikely be-
cause GATT members will probably not seek dispute settlement
unless their economic interests are seriously injured. Moreover, many
countries in the negotiations support the EC's position on the issue of
moral rights incorporation. Therefore, the United States should con-
cede the moral rights issue in favor of more important concessions
from the EC.
Making an intellectual property code an annex to the GATT,
rather than amending the GATT, would benefit the United States.
An annex could be used in the overall GATT negotiations as leverage,
perhaps to exact other concessions unrelated to intellectual property
protection. However, an annex might be less effective in preventing
piracy. This is because countries believed to inadequately protect
United States copyrights could become members of the GATT, and
thereby obtain most favored nation status' 4° without joining the
138. The United States and the EC are the first and second largest exporters of copy-
righted works, respectively, and together form a powerful and important block. See US. Ad-
heres to the Berne Convention: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1987) (statement of
Senator Patrick J. Leahy).
139. See Press Conference with United States Trade Representative Carla Hills, FED. NEWS
SERV., Apr. 27, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File.
140. Under the most favored nation clause of article I of the GATT, if one contracting
country gives favored treatment to another contracting country, it must give that same treat-
ment to all contracting countries. Article I states in relevant part: "[A]ny advantage, favour,
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TRIPs annex. If TRIPs is made an amendment to the GATT, these
same countries are not likely to forfeit the economic benefits provided
by the GATT simply to avoid protecting other nationals' copyrights.
Thus, both the EC and the United States would benefit from increased
membership in a GATT-integrated intellectual property code that
would effectively supplant the Berne Convention.
Another advantage of a GATT code, whether in the form of an
annex or an amendment, is that the United States would have more
input in crafting minimum standards for the protection of intellectual
property rights, including copyright. In this regard, the model law
discussions reveal the differing approaches of the EC, comprised pri-
marily of civil law countries, and the United States and other com-
mon law countries. Civil law countries protect the rights of the
author, rather than the author's employer, as in the United States.' 4'
Unlike the United States, civil law countries provide clear moral
rights protection and do not recognize "fair use"' 142 as a limitation on
authors' rights.'43 Civil law countries also rely on collective adminis-
tration of copyright royalties to a much greater extent than the
United States, by providing more compulsory licensing circumstances
than United States copyright law. Common law countries favor effec-
tive enforcement that includes civil and criminal penalties, access to
courts, availability of adequate procedures and appropriate burdens of
proof, and the ability to impose liability on sellers and other distribu-
tors.' " They also favor transitional provisions permitting retroactive
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or des-
tined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties." GATT
supra note 38, art. I.
141. See DIETZ, supra note 125, at 63.
142. "Fair use" is the privilege held by someone other than the owner of the copyright to
use copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without consent. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 538 (5th ed. 1979). Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended through July
15, 1990, provides the following four factors to consider when determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1990).
143. See DIETZ, supra note 125, at 181-84.
144. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 6, at 57.
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copyright protection for pre-existing works.145
The issue of home copying does not appear to present a major
conflict between the United States and the EC. Both will probably
adopt the SCMS method of protection. Japan, a major manufacturer
of DAT recorders, can be expected to oppose the measure. If such a
measure is left out of the TRIPs agreement altogether, which appears
likely in light of the draft proposals, it can certainly be incorporated
into other agreements. This is an especially viable option because of
the dynamic nature of the technology used to inhibit recording, which
makes agreement on the issue in the TRIPs negotiations elusive.
The EC and the United States will probably agree on the protec-
tion of computer programs. However, protection of interfaces and
provisions for reverse engineering may create a conflict. While
United States manufacturers have lobbied against the protection of
interfaces, the United States government has favored their protec-
tion.'46 The EC will probably concur with the position favoring pro-
tection as interoperability would not be in the best interest of the
fledgling European software companies. 47 Thus, the dispute may be
limited to the issue of reverse engineering, which the EC desires and
the United States opposes. 48 The United States should attempt to
persuade the EC that it is in their best interest to protect the programs
from reverse engineering, as this area may be particularly vulnerable
to piracy from developing countries.
In the area of enforcement and dispute resolution, the United
States should press for the GATT as the primary method of intellec-
tual property protection. The GATT's enforcement procedures are
more delineated than other multilateral agreements. As such, a
GATT panel may deliver a more detailed and reasoned decision than
would WIPO. Further, the GATT is a more effective moral per-
suader, due to its intrinsic ties to economics. As a result, every coun-
try seeks to be a member of the GATT in good-standing. Moreover,
the TRIPs proposal requires each signatory country to incorporate
enforcement measures into its national law.' 49 Therefore, member
countries should accept GATT panel rulings readily.
Further, because the dispute mechanism under the WIPO trea-
145. Id.
146. See Takahashi, supra note 70, at D6.
147. See European Parliament, supra note 64.
148. Id.
149. US. TRIPs Proposal, supra note 41, pt. 3, art. 1.
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ties is currently inadequate, the United States must insist on panel
reports, prompt decisions, removal of the right to block a panel deci-
sion, and a speedy mechanism for sanctions if the panel decision is not
implemented. Perhaps the most important issue to be resolved, how-
ever, involves the United States' "Special 301" proceeding.
Nearly all of the United States' trading partners have indicated
that they will not agree to the United States' proposed dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms unless it agrees to repeal "Special 301."150 The
United States' "Special 301" has been attacked vigorously around the
world and has caused friction in the GATT dispute resolution pro-
cess. This is unfortunate because the "Special 301" threat has been
pivotal in persuading other countries to protect United States intellec-
tual property rights. "Special 301" also encourages bilateral negotia-
tion and resolution by a GATT panel. As noted previously, bilateral
negotiations are an important element in resolving trade disputes and
in improving the chances of reaching multilateral agreements. Once
countries provide protection, they may become more amenable to a
GATT or WIPO agreement. Thus, "Special 301" is an example of
how bilateral negotiations, coupled with unilateral action, can result
in increased intellectual property protection. Further, once a GATT
panel has determined that a United States' right has been violated, the
GATT provides a procedure for blocking the GATT panel's action.1 51
However, these actions occur only after a country has been designated
an "unfair trader" by placing the country's name on the priority list
and publishing it in the Federal Register.152 This process makes the
GATT resolution more tenuous and exemplifies why other countries
oppose it.
The United States should consider giving up "Special 301."
First, some countries have questioned whether "Special 301" and the
GATT are compatible.1 53 Second, while the GATT does not permit
the United States to retaliate unilaterally when other countries do not
grant protection of intellectual property rights, 54 there are actions the
United States can take in conjunction with the GATT. These include
(1) conditioning all of its GATT concessions on the receipt of ade-
quate protection of intellectual property rights from other countries;
150. See Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 87.
151. GATT, supra note 38, art. XXIII; see also supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
152. See 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988).
153. See Trade Rows Distract Talks, GA TT Chief Says, REUTERS, May 18, 1989, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File.
154. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 6, at 45.
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(2) negotiating concessions on intellectual property rights from other
countries by attaching certain obligations to concessions granted on
particular products; and (3) bringing nullification or impairment
cases against other countries that violate United States intellectual
property rights. 55 Thus, if a TRIPs agreement is adopted as an
amendment to the GATT, giving up or greatly downplaying "Special
301" would not be a major United States concession.
However, Congress has not indicated that it will repeal "Special
301. ' 156 Thus, the USTR may have to persuade other countries that
"Special 301" will be used conservatively, and be prepared to offer
other incentives, such as the inclusion of a moral rights provision. If
these measures are successful, the United States may have an in-
creased chance of obtaining concessions on enforcement and dispute
mechanisms, a more important objective for the United States.
Another alternative for protecting United States copyrights in-
ternationally is through WIPO. Generally, WIPO efforts have fallen
short of the United States' objectives in the protection of intellectual
property rights.157 However, WIPO should complement the GATT.
Although the TRIPs talks should be the United States' main focus,
these talks should not be its only focus, because the United States may
not be able to achieve all of its objectives in the GATT. Thus, the
United States will have to continue to utilize WIPO to complement
the GATT.
The WIPO model copyright law discussions could provide the
United States with an opportunity to convince the international com-
munity that the United States' position is correct on a variety of con-
troversial issues, such as computer software and databases,
waivability of moral rights, recognition of employer authorship, and
protection of sound recordings. The WIPO model copyright law pro-
vides a model for countries without a copyright law; provides an op-
portunity for countries to upgrade or modernize their copyright law;
identifies new subject matters for copyright protection; and provides
an alternative to amending the Berne Convention, which itself may be
politically unsound. The EC recognizes WIPO's model provisions as
indispensable to the strict and proper interpretation of the Berne Con-
155. Id. at 45-46.
156. Press Conference with United States Trade Representative Carla Hills, FED. NEWS
SERV., Apr. 27, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File.
157. State Department Panel Examines Proposal by WIPO for International Copyright
Laws, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 77 (Jan. 18, 1989).
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vention. 158 The EC also turns to WIPO to provide satisfactory an-
swers to traditional copyright questions, especially as they relate to
new technologies.15 9 The EC Commission concluded in the Green Pa-
per that "[t]he further evolution of the Community's role within
WIPO in general is a matter of considerable importance given the
likelihood of further Community legislation on copyright and related
rights and, indeed, on other forms of intellectual property." 60 If
TRIPs fails and the model law is used as a Berne Protocol, the United
States will have more input into the Berne Convention, because it was
not a member when the Berne Convention was adopted initially.
While the United States must insist that the parties to a TRIPs
agreement should decide all questions regarding disputes, the United
States should also permit a provision allowing consultation with
WIPO. Additionally, the United States should participate in the
WIPO Dispute Settlement Treaty discussions in the event the United
States is unsuccessful in obtaining a viable dispute mechanism
through the GATT. Dispute resolution is an important enough issue
that its inclusion should be sought through whatever mechanism
possible.
Multilateral negotiations have proven to be more effective than
bilateral copyright negotiations because of the considerable leverage
that may be employed on the multilateral level. Further, bilateral ne-
gotiations may lead to inconsistent approaches. A danger also exists
that the EC and other developed countries may get a "free ride" in
the negotiations by allowing the United States alone to negotiate and
contribute to the costs of improved protection, which will then benefit
these other countries.
Having detailed the most important United States objectives, it
should be reiterated that improved copyright protection must be
achieved through a variety of means. By attempting to expand the
scope of the GATT, the United States can consolidate those gains in
copyright protection through WIPO or bilateral agreements. The
United States and the EC will have to define their respective interests
in terms of results, rather than through the text of any particular law
or agreement.
Coordination of multilateral and bilateral activities may be diffi-
cult. Therefore, a close working relationship between key officials in
158. See Follow-up Paper, supra note 46, at 24.
159. Id.
160. Green Paper, supra note 44, at 220.
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the United States government is crucial to the process. These officials
include the USTR, the Department of Commerce, the Patent and
Trademark Office, the Copyright Office, and the Department of State.
The EC's Follow-up Paper describes the role of the EC in multi-
lateral and bilateral external relations. It recognizes the effects of the
multilateral negotiations, especially the GATT Uruguay Round, on
bilateral negotiations.' 6' In addition, it recognizes that international
conventions have not yet achieved the objective of providing effective
international copyright protection, and concludes that problems with
individual countries need to be addressed in bilateral negotiations.1 62
The EC hopes that a TRIPs agreement will place bilateral negotia-
tions on a more stable footing. 63 In anticipating bilateral negotia-
tions, the EC will inventory the copyright laws of a majority of non-
member countries. It will then assess the difficulties the EC is en-
countering in those countries, including a summary of legislation and
regulations regarding copyright and neighboring rights. Because the
United States and the EC agree on overall protection, they are more
apt to use the multilateral forum. In this manner, the United States
and the EC will take the lead in designing the international standards
of copyright protection. Bilateral negotiations between developed and
developing countries, which are seen as the primary copyright infring-
ers, would necessarily continue.
V. CONCLUSION
As the world's leading exporter of copyrighted works, the United
States has a vital interest in protecting those works abroad. As a re-
sult, international intellectual property protection has become a chief
focus of the United States' trade negotiations. It is therefore no sur-
prise that many fora have emerged for protection of these rights. All
of these fora, including the GATT, should be utilized in order to as-
sure the broadest protection possible. Only in this way can the United
States hope to retain its share of the world market for copyrighted
works.
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